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COMMENTS
ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS IN MINNESOTA:
THE DUPLESSIE RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of adoptive admissions has been called an
"incongruous" doctrine that has gained "solemn authoritativeness."'
The admissibility of adoptive admissions, which are usually defined as
silence, actions, or statements which manifest assent to the statements
of another person, 2 raises important evidentiary and constitutional
questions, especially in criminal proceedings. In the recent case of State
v. Duplessie, 3 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a conviction based
on an adoptive admission, on the basis of Miranda v. Arizona.' In
Duplessie, the defendant was arrested with three juveniles for at-
tempted theft. The four were given Miranda warnings and interrogated
en masse. At the defendant's trial, the arresting officer testified over
strong and repeated objections that one of the juveniles had implicated
the defendant at the time of the arrest and the defendant had responded
by laughing and nodding his head. The trial court deemed the conduct
an adoptive admission and the defendant was convicted. On appeal the
defendant contended, inter alia, that the use of the officer's testimony
violated his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The Minnesota Supreme Court
agreed and reversed, stating that an unequivocal adoptive admission, if
proven, constitutes a waiver of those constitutional guarantees, but held
that the state failed to prove the admission was unequivocal, positive,
and definite. In so doing, the court based its decision on the Miranda
mandate that "high standards of proof" are required for the waiver of
1. See Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 586, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (1967) ("How so
incongruous a doctrine ever gained solemn authoritativeness might well be a subject for a
long article in a law review.").
2. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-
119 to -121 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER].
Words of another person can be received into evidence as admissions of the defendant
if it can be shown that the defendant adopted the statements as his own. The party may
designate by preappointment or reference a person whose statements he assents to as
correct; he may assent to a statement already made by another; or the statements of
another person having identity of interest with the party may be available as evidence.
See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 1069-87 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1972) (discussion of ways in which statements made by another person will be considered
adopted).
3. 304 Minn. 417, 231 N.W.2d 548 (1975).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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constitutional rights5 and not on the traditional grounds of relevancy
and hearsay. This raises questions concerning the admissibility of adop-
tive admissions when Miranda is inapplicable or if Miranda is overruled
as some commentators anticipate. This Comment will analyze the
Duplessie rule in light of the constitutional and evidentiary problems
inherent in adoptive admissions and will suggest that the rule be ex-
panded to apply in all cases whether or not the Miranda constitutional
requirements are present.
II. THE Miranda AND SIXTH AMENDMENT BASES OF Duplessie
The Duplessie court based its decision primarily on constitutional
grounds, holding that the defendant's constitutional right against self-
incrimination and right of confrontation were violated by allowing the
equivocal adoptive admission because the high standard of proof for the
waiver of these constitutional rights had not been satisfied.'
A. The Miranda Basis
The court was influenced by a footnote in Miranda v. Arizona, which
prohibited the use of adoptive admissions occurring after arrest and
evidenced by the defendant standing mute when accused of criminal
conduct.7 This restriction, consistent with the rest of the Miranda opin-
ion, is premised on the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination.' As a necessary corollary to the concern that a defendant
5. See 304 Minn. 417, 424, 231 N.W.2d 548, 552-53 (1975). The court stated:
The instant case provides an appropriate occasion for this court to announce
guidelines for the use or exclusion of adoptive admissions in criminal proceed-
ings . . . in conformity with the Miranda mandate that "high standards of
proof" are required for the waiver of constitutional rights. Indeed, the instant
case is a compelling example of the necessity of such a stringent standard.
Id. at 424, 231 N.W.2d at 552.
6. See id. at 421, 231 N.W.2d at 551. It should be noted, however, that if the defendant
specifically had adopted the statements as his own, he voluntarily would have waived the
constitutional right against self-incrimination and the right of confrontation would not
exist. The statement becomes the defendant's own and he has only himself to cross-
examine. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)[011, at 801-112.
7. In Miranda, the Court stated that "[t]he prosecution may not ... use at trial the
fact that he stood mute or claimed his [fifth amendment] privilege in the face of accusa-
tion" during a custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
8. The source of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is the maxim
nemo tenetur prodere (no man is bound to accuse himself). This maxim was used in
England in the sixteenth century in protest against the inquisitorial methods of the eccle-
siastical courts. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTrrTiON
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 841 (1953). The amend-
ment was added to the Constitution because of the conviction that "too high a price may
be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attain-
ment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed." Feldman v. United
[Vol. 3
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who has been arrested should not be compelled to incriminate himself,
the Miranda Court concluded that a defendant who chooses to remain
silent after arrest cannot be punished by allowing the fact of silence to
be admitted at trial as evidence of guilt.
Miranda was the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the
constitutional implications of adoptive admissions in criminal proceed-
ings.10 After Miranda, however, a conflict arose among the federal cir-
cuits as to whether Miranda prohibited the admission of evidence of
silence in response to police interrogation." To resolve the conflict, the
Supreme Court first required the exclusion of adoptive admissions when
the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial impact." Later
it held the use of post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes denied
the defendant due process. 3 Thus Miranda and its progeny established
States, 322 U.S. 487, 498 (1944), overruled on other grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
9. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
10. As early as 1895, the Supreme Court allowed adoptive admissions, thus implying
that adoptive admissions were not constitutionally infirm. See Sparf v. United States, 156
U.S. 51, 56 (1895). In Sparf, the Court ruled that the statements implicating the defendant
were admissible because they had been made in his presence under circumstances war-
ranting the inference that he naturally would have contradicted them if they had not been
true. Id. The Court, however, did not detail the circumstances or comment on the defen-
dant being in custody at the time the statements were made.
11. Compare Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.) (cross-examination of
defendant concerning his failure to tell police his story and reference to this during closing
arguments infringed his fifth amendment right to remain silent), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
878 (1973) and United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206, 1209 (2d Cir. 1970) (prosecu-
tion's references to defendant's failure to answer FBI agent's questions after his arrest
violated the principle that inference of guilt cannot be drawn from silence after arrest)
and United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969) (evidence of defendant's
failure following his arrest to tell FBI agents his version of story violated his right to
remain silent) and Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant's choice
to exercise privilege against self-incrimination and to remain silent may not be used
against him if he testifies in his own defense) with United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure of defendant to disclose shooting to police after
arrest on another charge could properly be used on cross-examination to refute credibility
of defendant's testimony) and United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir.)
(defendant's election to testify gave prosecution right to show his prior inconsistent act of
remaining silent at time of his arrest), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
12. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
The Court found that in light of the alternative explanations existing for pretrial silence,
including intimidation by the secretive setting, fear, and possible preference to speak in
the presence of an attorney or in open court, silence was not sufficiently probative of an
inconsistency with testimony at his trial to allow admission. In addition to lacking proba-
tive value, the inference that can be drawn by the jury as to silence at the time of arrest
is highly prejudicial. See id. at 179-80.
13. Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). The state prosecutor sought to impeach the
exculpatory testimony of a defendant who told his story for the first time at his trial. The
defendant was cross-examined about his failure to tell his story after he was arrested and
19771
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that silence after arrest does not constitute an adoptive admission in
criminal cases. The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Duplessie thus was within the guidelines of Miranda.4 However, be-
cause the scope of the Miranda decision is too narrow to cover all adop-
tive admissions, reliance on constitutional grounds to create a general
adoptive admissions standard may create problems."
At least three limitations imposed by use of Miranda as the basis for
the admittance of adoptive admissions in Minnesota must be consid-
ered. First, Miranda applies only to criminal cases. Second, Miranda
applies only when admissions occur after arrest. Third, Miranda may
be overruled.
1. Miranda Basis of Decision Limits Rule to Criminal Cases
The court in Duplessie limited its "unequivocal, positive, and defi-
nite" adoptive admissions test to criminal cases 6 because the rule was
promulgated based on Miranda which applies only to criminal cases. 7
It distinquished a more permissive Iowa adoptive admissions standard,
which allowed a nod of the head as sufficient indication of adoption, on
the basis that the Iowa standard was promulgated in a civil case,"
thereby leaving open the question of the applicability of Duplessie to
non-criminal proceedings. 9
The propriety of placing restrictions on adoptive admissions in only
criminal cases is questionable. Undoubtedly, a criminal defendant
whose liberty is at stake deserves protection against involuntary waiver
of his rights, yet the fundamental problems with adoptive admissions,
lack of probative value and inherent prejudicial nature, make them
given the Miranda warnings. The Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that
his right to remain silent carries no penalty. Subsequent use of the resulting silence thus
violates due process. Id. at 2242-45.
14. The requirement of the Duplessie court that adoption of an admission be manifested
by an unequivocal, positive, and definite response meets the mandate of Miranda that
"high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights" be set. 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966).
15. The Miranda doctrine specifically applies only to individuals taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. See United States v.
Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 1778 (1976) (Miranda warnings need not be given to a witness
called to testify before the grand jury about his alleged criminal activities because no
custodial police interrogation was involved).
16. 304 Minn. at 425, 231 N.W.2d at 553.
17. The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is limited to statements which
may lead to criminal prosecution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; State v. Beckey, 291 Minn.
483, 486, 192 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1971). But see Prideaux v. State, -Minn. - -
247 N.W.2d 385, 389 (1976) ("civil" label will not be allowed to obscure the quasi-criminal
consequences of driver's license revocation for driving while intoxicated).
18. Bill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 1215, 1223, 119 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1963).
19. See notes 83-88 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 3
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unreliable in civil proceedings as well.2" The use of adoptive admissions
should be restricted severely in all cases, civil and criminal. By limiting
its decision to criminal trials, the court left open the possibility of a less
restrictive standard in civil cases.
2. Miranda Basis of Decision Limits Rule to Admissions Occurring
After Arrest
The reliance by the court on Miranda leaves open the standard to be
applied in criminal cases when admissions occur before arrest. Miranda
attempted to guard against self-incrimination after arrest unless the
right voluntarily was waived with a full understanding of the constitu-
tional rights involved and accordingly required a warning only if the
defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation when he confessed.'
The Miranda Court apparently intended the same restriction to be ap-
plied to adoptive admissions because it stressed that silence during
police custodial interrogation is not a waiver of fifth amendment rights."
Thus, the application of the Miranda rule to pre-arrest adoptive admis-
sions is uncertain.
Although Miranda does not apply specifically to pre-arrest adoptive
admissions, no satisfactory reasons exist for excluding such admissions
from the rule. The right against self-incrimination does not apply only
when a person is under arrest. It can be invoked whenever a person is
asked to incriminate himself. 3 Thus, the same right of silence extends
beyond arrest and applies regardless of when the interrogation occurs.
In Duplessie, the defendant's alleged adoptive admission occurred after
arrest. The court, however, did not limit its holding to post-arrest ad-
missions, but rather stated it was announcing guidelines to be applied
whenever adoptive admissions "are sought to be introduced as evidence
20. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966). The rationale for the rule was to
protect an accused's constitutional rights in the inherently compulsive atmosphere of in-
custody interrogations.
22. 384 U.S. at 475. Miranda, it should be noted, applies only to situations of silence
or where the privilege is actually claimed. Equivocal responses or conduct may not be
included in the Miranda protection. See McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 161, at 354 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMIcK].
23. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In any federal proceeding, a witness cannot be compelled
to give evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature that might subject him to any
criminal prosecution. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2252 (J.
McNaughton rev. 1961). The privilege may be invoked in any judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding or investigation which may furnish a lead upon which a criminal prosecution
may be based. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924) (privilege available
to a bankrupt appearing for examination concerning his estate); Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) (one called before a grand jury can invoke the privilege).
19771
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against a defendant in a criminal proceeding."2 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court thus apparently did not limit the constitutional protec-
tions afforded defendants against involuntary adoptive admissions to
post-arrest interrogations.
The scope of the Miranda-based restrictions on adoptive admissions
may be limited further by the identity of the accuser, because the ad-
mission must be in response to accusations by a police officer or prosecu-
tor. Miranda is premised on the assumption that the defendant is under
police arrest and being questioned by police officers when the admission
is made.2' Whether the Miranda rule on adoptive admissions applies to
situations where a private party accuses the defendant of committing a
crime and the defendant does not deny the accusation is still open to
question.2 6 Thus, a private party might be allowed to testify to the
refusal of the defendant to deny the accusation without fear of constitu-
tional restrictions.Y The result is troublesome because the lack of proba-
tive value is inherent in most adoptive admissions,"8 even if the right
against self-incrimination as set forth in Miranda does not provide pro-
tection against informal conversation while not in custody.2 By premis-
ing an adoptive admissions rule almost solely on constitutional grounds,
as was done in Duplessie, an uncertainty exists as to the admissibility
of adoptive admissions which may be objectionable on merely eviden-
tiary grounds.30 In Duplessie, however, the court did not limit specifi-
24. 304 Minn. at 425, 231 N.W.2d at 553.
25. The requirements of Miranda apply only when the subject "is taken into custody"
and is "questioned." In Miranda, the Court declared that "by custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S.
at 444.
26. See MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 354-56; Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in
Light of the Expanding Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 335, 343-
44 (1967).
27. See, e.g., People v. Tolbert, 70 Cal. 2d 790, 805-06, 452 P.2d 661, 669, 76 Cal. Rptr.
445, 453 (1969) (witness' question to defendant regarding ownership of gun and defen-
dant's evasive response held admissible), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972); State v.
Thomas, 440 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1969) (defendant's silence while associate said in his pres-
ence that they had robbed a cab driver held admissible).
28. See notes 71-82 infra and accompanying text.
Silence and equivocal responses are completely lacking in probative value; however, if
the admission is adopted by an affirmative statement or an affirmative, unequivocal
action, it would be probative.
29. This lack of protection may extend to numerous other situations not deemed to be
"in custody." See State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445, 454 P.2d 987 (1969) (defendant's
silence while his companion asked officer who stopped defendant's car to arrest defendant
because defendant had just beaten him held admissible), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1023
(1970); Ryan v. State, 451 P.2d 383 (Okla. Crim. 1969) (defendant's reaction to statement
made by defendant's companion after police entered room but before arrest held admissi-
ble).
30. The adoptive admission may' lack probative value, be highly prejudicial, or not
[Vol. 3
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cally its standards to admissions during police interrogation,3' but
rather adopted a rule which applies to all adoptive admissions in crimi-
nal cases. Thus, the Duplessie rule would apparently apply outside the
custodial interrogation setting, but the facts in Duplessie itself did not
require such an expansion; the alleged admission occurred after arrest
in the presence of a police officer, and hence the issue as yet is unre-
solved in Minnesota.
3. The Status of Miranda
A final problem with relying solely on Miranda as support for an
adoptive admissions rule is the possibility that the Miranda decision
will be overruled .32 Several authorities have predicted such a ruling,
observing that a majority of the Court may be hostile toward the policy
of federal courts establishing rules on admissibility of evidence in state
court cases.Y If Miranda is overturned, the expressed basis for the deci-
sion in Duplessie is severely undercut. Thus, a sounder approach would
be to base objections to adoptive admissions on evidentiary as well as
constitutional grounds and give consideration to the probative value,
prejudicial impact, and hearsay characteristics of the testimony.u
B. Right to Confrontation Basis
In addition to relying on Miranda and the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, the Duplessie court held that the sixth
overcome the inherent hearsay characteristics. See notes 71-103 infra and accompanying
text.
31. See 304 Minn. at 425, 231 N.W.2d at 553.
32. The trend of the Court has been to erode steadily the principles of Miranda. See,
e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct. 1768, 1778 (1976) (Court refused to expand
right to Miranda warning to a grand jury witness called to testify about criminal activities
in which he may have been involved); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (shield
provided by Miranda does not prohibit confrontation after claiming privilege with prior
inconsistent statements used for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Mosley, 96 S. Ct.
321 (1975) (Miranda does not require discontinuance of questioning once right to remain
silent has been exercised). But see Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977) (the contin-
ued validity of the Miranda warnings was raised but the Court chose not to address the
issue at this time).
33. See, e.g., Comment, Admissibility of Confessions-Dancing on the Grave of
Miranda?, 10 SuvFoLK U.L. REv. 1141, 1178 (1976). See generally Stephens, The Burger
Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEo. L.J. 249, 258-59 (1971); Note,
Michigan v. Tucker: A Reevaluation of Miranda, 27 MAINE L. Rav. 365, 376 (1975); Note,
Resumption of Questioning After Right to Remain Silent Has Been Exercised, 27 MERcER
L. REv. 1203, 1206 (1976).
34. See notes 71-103 infra and accompanying text.
However, even if the Miranda warnings are diluted by the Supreme Court, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court could require the same warnings based on the Minnesota state consti-
tution to guarantee an accused is aware of his rights. It is likely that the court would do
so. See, e.g., State v. Fossen, - Minn. - , 255 N.W.2d 357 (1977).
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amendment right to confrontation35 requires that admissibility of adop-
tive admissions be limited .3 In Duplessie, the accusatory statements
were made by a juvenile who was arrested with the defendant. The
prosecution introduced testimony by a police officer who observed de-
fendant's reaction to those accusations. 7 The court stressed that the
primary effect of the officer's testimony was not simply to explain the
defendant's reaction to the accusation, but instead to focus on the con-
tent of the accuser's statement, thereby seeking to "end run" the defen-
dant's right of confrontation. 8 For that reason, the court held the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right was violated.
The court's ruling in Duplessie concerning the confrontation clause
was undoubtedly proper given the facts of the case, but as with the
Miranda aspects of Duplessie, the sixth amendment does not apply to
all adoptive admissions. It is not applicable in civil cases, although the
common-law hearsay rules serve much the same function.3 9 More im-
portantly, the sixth amendment does not bar the admissibility of adop-
tive admissions introduced through testimony by the person who made
35. Originally, at common-law, a party accused of a felony was not allowed to call
witnesses to contradict testimony offered by the Crown because it would have been derog-
atory to the royal dignity. Later, witnesses were allowed to be called but they were not
placed under oath and their testimony carried little weight until Queen Anne's time when
the witnesses were put under oath. One source attributes the right of confrontation to the
common-law reaction against the abuses of the Raleigh trial. See F. HEULER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (1951). A crucial element in
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603 was the statement of Mr. Cobham which
implicated Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne. Although Raleigh received a written
retraction, indicating that Cobham would testify in his behalf, the court ruled that Ra-
leigh did not have the right to have Cobham called as a witness and Raleigh was convicted.
See 9 W. HoLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 216-17, 226-28 (7th ed. rev. 1956); 1 J.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 333-36 (1883).
The sixth amendment was enacted to preserve the common-law right. Salinger v.
United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926). Until recently, the confrontation clause was not
used extensively by the courts to exclude evidence because of its similarity to the hear-
say rule. See FED. R. EvID., art. VIII, Note of Advis. Comm., reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. at
522-25 (1975). However, the Supreme Court has recognized confrontation as an aspect of
procedural due process and the cases have expanded the clause beyond being merely a
constitutional embodiment of the hearsay rule. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 n.3 (1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966). The confrontation cases
emphasize the importance of the personal presence of the witness at the trial and afford-
ing the opportunity for cross-examination. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 606.
36. See 304 Minn. at 422, 231 N.W.2d at 551.
37. Id. at 419, 231 N.W.2d at 550.
38. "The prosecution here seeks to 'end run' the constitutional impediments at issue
by attempting to categorize defendant's conduct as an adoptive admission." Id. at 424,
231 N.W.2d at 552-53.
39. See notes 94-103 infra and accompanying text. The controlling reason given by the
courts for the rejection of hearsay is that allowing such evidence deprives the adversary
party of his opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant at the time of the
hearsay statement or conduct. See MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 245, at 583-84.
[Vol. 3
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the accusation." In that situation, the defendant has a right to confront
and cross-examine his accuser, thereby eliminating any confrontation
clause objections. The evidence of the defendant's silence or non-
commital response to the accusation, however, is still heard by the jury
and the subtle implications, that a person who does not deny an accusa-
tion must be guilty, are still present.
An additional limitation on the use of the sixth amendment in adop-
tive admission cases is its possible inapplicability when the testimony
actually is being presented only to show defendant's response to the
accusation rather than as a method of introducing the content of the
accuser's statement. A third party's testimony concerning an absent
witness' accusation is inadmissible because the accusing party is not
present for cross-examination. However, if a third person testifies as to
his observations of the defendant's reaction to the accusation in such a
case, then the sixth amendment may not be violated." The accuser's
statement thus could be introduced without the right of confrontation
on the theory that the truth of the statement is not relevant to the
validity of the third person's testimony. Whether the court in Duplessie
rejected this type of argument is not clear. The court stressed that the
effect of the police officer's testimony was to admit the juvenile's accu-
sation and that the testimony concerning the defendant's reaction was
of minimal probative value.' 2
C. Summary
The court's decision in Duplessie was correct based on the particular
facts of the case. However, by expressing a general rule premised pri-
marily on constitutional grounds, gaps may occur where the rule may
not apply. A sounder approach would be to stress the relevancy prob-
lems with adoptive admissions. By expanding the basis of the rule to
incorporate the requirements that evidence be probative without being
unduly prejudicial and not be hearsay in addition to the requisite consti-
tutional requirements, the Duplessie rule could be applied to cases in
which the constitutional rights of an individual are not at issue.
40. If the witness testifying to the defendant's reaction to the incriminating statement
is also the accuser, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine. However, the
witness' statement may still be hearsay. See notes 97-103 infra and accompanying text.
As previously discussed, an unequivocal adoptive admission is a waiver of the sixth
amendment right to confrontation. See State v. Duplessie, 304 Minn. at 421, 231 N.W.2d
at 551.
41. A witness' testimony is generally admissible if it is based on his personal knowledge
of the facts involved. For a discussion of the degree of knowledge necessary, see 2 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 650-64 (3d ed. 1940).
42. See 304 Minn. at 424, 231 N.W.2d at 552-53.
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III. COMMON-LAW PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS
Historically, the admissibility of adoptive admissions has been re-
stricted on common-law evidentiary grounds as well as constitutional
grounds. To be admissible, the adoptive admission must be relevant and
the probative value must not be outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.4 3 In addition, adoptive admissions must not be used to cir-
cumvent the hearsay rule."
A. Common-Law Restrictions on Adoptive Admissions
Although the constitutionally-based restrictions on the use of adop-
tive admissions are of relatively recent vintage, adoptive admissions
long have been restricted on common-law evidentiary grounds. The an-
cient maxim qui tacet consentire videtur, silence gives consent, gave rise
to the early rule that statements made in a person's presence and not
expressly denied were admissible. 5 Several early state supreme court
decisions began to realize the evidentiary problems inherent in the doc-
trine and sought to dislodge its rigidity. In the leading case,
Commonwealth v. Kenney,'7 the rules governing admissibility of admis-
sions adopted by silence were crystallized. In Kenney, the court held
that silence did not constitute an adoptive admission to another per-
son's statement unless (1) the statement was heard and understood by
the accused person, (2) the truth of the statement was within that per-
son's knowledge, (3) the person was at liberty to speak, and (4) the
statement naturally called for a reply.
48
Unfortunately, subsequent cases failed to adhere closely to the stan-
dards of Kenney. The requirements for admissibility in criminal pro-
ceedings varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 9 and even from case to
43. See notes 71-93 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 94-103 infra and accompanying text.
45. 1 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EvDENCE IN Crviv CASES § 291 (1896).
The justification for the admittance of testimony as to one's silence is based on either
of two theories. The first is the assumption that the party intended to express his assent
and the second is the inference of the probable state of belief. MCCORMICK, supra note 22,
§ 270, at 652.
46. See Moore v. Smith, 14 Serg. & Rawl. 388, 392-93 (Pa. 1826) (that silence means
consent presupposes a statement that one is bound to deny or admit; "[niothing can be
more dangerous than this kind of evidence"); Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457, 463 (1838) (while
silence may raise an inference in certain circumstances, the mere silence of the party
creates no evidence one way or the other).
47. 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847).
48. Id. at 237.
49. The following jurisdictions did not allow silence of one under arrest as an adoptive
admission: McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928) (defendant's silence
during accusatory statements by companion not admissible because no duty to speak after
arrest); Hauger v. United States, 173 F. 54 (4th Cir. 1909) (silence after arrest during
interrogation of another party not admissible where defendant may have felt not at liberty
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case within a jurisdiction. 0 Some courts established a per se rule that
silence after an arrest is never an adoptive admission,"' while for other
courts arrest is only one of the circumstances to be considered. 5 In
to speak); Cook v. People, 56 Colo. 477, 138 P. 756 (1914) (silence not admissible unless
circumstances show intent to commit oneself by that silence); State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn.
258, 116 A. 336 (1922) (questions to accused under arrest not admissible if defendant
makes no reply); Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 So. 856 (1903) (state had burden of
showing defendant ten feet away heard accusatory statements); Johnson v. State, 151 Ga.
21, 105 S.E. 603 (1921) (silence by accused during interrogation of third party insufficient
evidence to sustain guilty verdict); Diblee v. State, 202 Ind. 571, 177 N.E. 261 (1931)
(accusatory statements made in presence of accused who remains silent not competent
evidence of admission); State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa 730, 11 N.W. 675 (1882) (failure to deny
accusatory statements while in custody not admission); State v. Roberts, 149 La. 657, 89
So. 888 (1921) (accusatory statement and defendant's silence while under arrest inadmis-
sible); State v. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919 (1882) (defendant's silence to accusatory state-
ments while in custody not inference of admission); State v. Goldfeder, 242 S.W. 403 (Mo.
1922) (one under arrest under no duty to deny implicatory statements); O'Hearn v. State,
79 Neb. 513, 113 N.W. 130 (1907) (defendant's refusal to make a statement while in
custody after hearing companions' statements not assent to those statements); People v.
Smith, 172 N.Y. 210, 64 N.E. 814 (1902) (in-custody defendant's silence at wife's deathbed
not admissible as acquiescence in her conduct); Walker v. State, 37 Ohio App. 540, 175
N.E. 29 (1930) (jury not entitled to consider accused's silence in presence of accusations
while under arrest); Vaughan v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 685, 127 P. 264 (1911) (new trial
granted where jury heard accusatory statements to which accused in custody had made
no reply); State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 A. 204 (1903) (accused's silence under arrest
raises no inference against him); Gardner v. State, 34 S.W. 945 (Tex. Crim. 1896) (evi-
dence of silence in presence of accusatory statements while in custody not admissible).
The following jurisdictions required denial even when the accused was under arrest:
Raymond v. State, 154 Ala. 1, 45 So. 895 (1908) (failure to deny accusation while under
arrest is made in the nature of confession and is admissible); People v. McNamara, 65
Cal. App. 521, 224 P. 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (silence where direct, specific accusation
is made is a quasi-confession); Territory v. Buick, 27 Hawaii 28 (1923) (in-custody defen-
dant's silence and incomprehensible reply to accusations admissible); Ackerson v. People,
124 Il1. 563, 16 N.E. 847 (1888) (evidence that defendant under arrest hung head and was
silent during accusations is implied admission); Diamond v. State, 195 Ind. 285, 144 N.E.
466 (1924) (defendant's silence where circumstances call for a reply to accusation admissi-
ble); Pierson v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 584, 17 S.W.2d 697 (1929) (direct accusation to
defendant in custody calls for denial and silence is implied admission); People v. Court-
ney, 178 Mich. 137, 144 N.W. 568 (1913) (if circumstances call for reply, in-custody
defendant's silence to accusatory statements admissible); State v. Won, 76 Mont. 509, 248
P. 201 (1926) (defendant's silence admissible if defendant heard and understood accusa-
tions); State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 P. 977 (1907) (statements made ten feet away
from defendant presumed to have been heard); State v. Booker, 68 W. Va. 8, 69 S.E. 295
(1910) (if in similar circumstances an innocent man would deny accusation, defendant's
silence admissible).
50. Compare State v. Goldfeder, 242 S.W. 403, 404-05 (Mo. 1922) (guilt will not be
inferred from silence after arrest) with State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 617, 29 S.W. 700,
702 (1895) (arrest alone will not exclude presumption of adoption by silence).
51. See, e.g., McGrew v. State, 293 P.2d 381, 385-86 (Okla. Crim. 1956); Falknor,
Evidence, 1957 Survey of American Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 512, 517 (1957).
52. See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 716-20, 172 P.2d 18, 27-29 (1946); State v.
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addition, in criminal cases, some courts treated a non-commital re-
sponse or reaction as silence, 5 while others were more lenient in admit-
ting such responses than they were in admitting responses based on
silence." The courts also were split in civil cases with some treating
admissions less stringently than in criminal cases,5" while others applied
the same standards to both civil and criminal cases.5
Prior to Duplessie, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not explicitly
delineated the requirements for the admissibility of an adoptive admis-
sion. An examination of the early supreme court decisions indicates the
requirements of Kenney generally were not stringently followed. 7 The
presence of the defendant at the time of the statement was a circum-
stance given a disproportionate amount of weight; the factfinder was not
always required to consider the protective factors mandated by
Kenney.5 8 Throughout the cases, however, the court emphasized that
Picciotti, 12 N.J. 205, 209-10, 96 A.2d 406, 408-09 (1953); State v. Moore, 262 N.C. 431,
437, 137 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1964).
53. See, e.g., State v. Farnsworth, 14 Utah 2d 303, 383 P.2d 489 (1963) (defendant's
response to accusation by cellmate regarding the only thing they could "get" him for held
inadmissible). See also Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 210, 227
(1963).
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hebert, 264 Mass. 571, 578, 163 N.E. 189, 191-92 (1928)
(where defendant answered accusations equivocally rather than remaining silent, state-
ments, and replies held admissible).
55. See, e.g., Bill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 1215, 1223, 119 N.W.2d 768,
772-73 (1963).
56. See Pulver v. Union Inv. Co., 279 F. 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1922) (admission must be
certain, consistent, and definite in breach of contract case); Hudson v. Augustine's Inc.,
72 Ill. App. 225, 236-38, 218 N.E.2d 510, 516 (1966) (an admission of a party to be used
against him in negligence suit must be unequivocal, positive, and definite in character).
57. See State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 434-35, 10 N.W.2d 373, 377-78 (1943) (undenied
accusations made against defendant of violation of charter provisions admissible); State
v. Rediker, 214 Minn. 470, 480, 8 N.W.2d 527, 532 (1943) (accusations that defendant beat
his wife made directly to defendant replied to evasively or with silence admissible as
admissions); State v. Graham, 176 Minn. 164, 167, 222 N.W. 909, 910 (1929) (defendant's
failure to deny accusations that he was drunk at time in question admission by conduct);
State v. Kerr, 162 Minn. 309, 310, 202 N.W. 727, 727 (1925) (undenied accusation made
by accident victim to police in defendant's presence that defendant was drunk admissi-
ble); State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 339, 112 N.W. 409, 411-12 (1907) (defendant's silence
when wife told third party that defendant had shot man who had harmed wife's daughter
admissible); State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385, 386, 45 N.W. 848, 848 (1890) (Mitchell, J.)
(silence in face of charge that defendant had living wife in Sweden an admission).
58. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 176 Minn. 164, 167, 222 N.W. 909, 910 (1929).
In 1890, Justice Mitchell held silence, in the face of a charge, was in the nature of an
admission of the facts encompassed in that charge. See State v. Plym, 43 Minn. 385, 386,
45 N.W. 848, 848 (1890). Subsequent cases ruled that the jury had to decide whether
silence under the circumstances was an admission that the statement was true. See State
v. Rediker, 214 Minn. 470, 480, 8 N.W.2d 527, 532 (1943); State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478,
482-83, 296 N.W. 582, 585 (1941). In State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 339, 112 N.W. 409,
411-12 (1907), the following jury instruction was ruled to have been proper:
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the evidence could not be offered "as proof of a fact asserted but only
as a predicate to the showing of the reaction of the accused thereto." 5
In 1941,"0 the Minnesota Supreme Court hinted in dictum that arrest
might destroy any basis for an inference of adoption by silence and that
silence might not be acquiescence where the statements were not ad-
dressed to the defendant."' The court, however, admitted that this was
still an open question in the state.2 Twelve years later the court ruled
that an adoptive admission was not admissible as substantive evidence
because no testimony was presented as to the conduct or response of the
defendant to accusatory statements other than that the statements were
made in her presence. 3 The court held that without further foundation,
the admission of the statements was clearly erroneous.' In addition,
because the defendant was under arrest at the time, under advice of
counsel, and the evidence was unclear whether the statements were
directed at the defendant, the court expressed considerable doubt that
the statements would be admissible even if more than the mere presence
of the defendant had been shown. 5
Although the Minnesota court has not looked kindly upon admissions
based on silence, it has treated adoptive admissions with less hostility
when the accused person did something other than remain silent." The
response "What is this all about?" was held to be admissible as evidence
of adoption; the court reasoned that the rule is only for the benefit of
those who remain silent. 7 This distinction, however, apparently was
restricted by the Duplessie rule which limits the use of adoptive admis-
sions based on non-commital responses as well as those based on si-
Now, it is for you to say whether such statements should be taken as admissions
of the defendant on account of his silence and failure to deny them, if you believe
that the circumstances were such as to require him to deny them, or whether
his failure to deny them was due to his determination not to speak at that time,
as it is claimed that he asserted at the time.
However, the only circumstance considered by the court on review of a case in which the
defendant was involved in an automoble accident was the proximity of the defendant to
the policeman when the other accident victim reported that the defendant was drunk. The
defendant's mental and physical condition and the physical surroundings were not consid-
ered. State v. Kerr, 162 Minn. 309, 310, 202 N.W. 727, 727 (1925).
59. State v. Rediker, 214 Minn. 470, 480, 8 N.W.2d 527, 532 (1943). See State v. Gul-
brandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 514, 57 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1953).
60. State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 296 N.W. 582 (1941).
61. Id. at 482, 296 N.W. at 585.
62. Id.
63. See State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 57 N.W.2d 419 (1953).
64. Id. at 513, 57 N.W.2d at 423.
65. Id. at 514, 57 N.W.2d at 423. The court warned against the possible results if such
testimony was admitted. An overzealous prosecutor was envisioned examining witnesses
in front of a defendant and building an entire case on hearsay. Id.
66. See State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 296 N.W. 582 (1941).
67. Id. at 483, 296 N.W. at 585.
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lence."8 Duplessie, however, involved a post-arrest admission which
came within the realm of the Miranda decision,69 while the non-
commital response held admissible in the earlier case occurred prior to
the defendant's arrest. 0
B. Relevancy
If the evidence presented does not tend to establish or disprove a
material proposition, it is inadmissible because of its lack of probative
value." This requirement of relevancy exposes the principal shortcom-
ing of adoptive admissions. The underlying theory of adoptive admis-
sions is that when a person is accused, he would naturally deny the
accusation unless he is guilty as charged7 2 This assumption, however,
is questionable at best. Silence or a non-commital response to an accu-
sation is explainable by influences which have no relationship to the
guilt of an accused person in criminal proceedings or the liability of a
person in civil proceedings.7"
No empirical data exist to explain the probable motivation for silence
in the face of an accusation.74 When accused of a crime, a person might
remain silent for several reasons. He may fear any reply will be dis-
torted, misquoted, or unfairly used against him;7 5 believe his security is
best promoted by his silence;"6 desire not to communicate with his accu-
ser;" be unsure of his rights;" not want to dignify the accusations with
a response; 9 or simply be startled or afraid." Since Miranda, moreover,
68. See 304 Minn. at 424, 231 N.W.2d at 552-53.
69. Id. at 422, 231 N.W.2d at 549-50.
70. See State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 482, 296 N.W. 582, 585 (1941).
71. See Boland v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 98-99, 132 N.W.2d 711, 719 (1965); MINN. R.
EVID. 401. For a discussion of relevancy, see MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at § 185.
72. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, at 801-120.
73. See notes 75-81 infra and accompanying text.
74. See Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 335, 342 (1967).
75. Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339 Mass. 154, 157, 158 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1959).
76. See Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235, 237 (1847); Brody,
Admissions Implied from Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massachusetts Criminal
Cases, 42 B.U.L. REV. 46, 51 (1962).
77. See Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 51 (9th Cir. 1969); 4 WEINS'TEIN & BERGER,
supra note 2, at 801-121 n.7.
78. See Brody, Admissions Implied from Silence, Evasion and Equivocation in Massa-
chusetts Criminal Cases, 42 B.U.L. REv. 46, 49 (1962).
79. See Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 585, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (1967). The
court quoted Robert G. Ingersoll, George Bernard Shaw, and Abraham Lincoln concerning
the "natural" reply to silence:
In his funeral oration on Roscoe Conkling, Robert G. Ingersoll said: "He was
maligned, misrepresented and misunderstood, but he would not answer. He was
as silent then as he is now-and his silence, better than any form of speech,
refuted every charge." George Bernard Shaw said: "Silence is the most perfect
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the defendant's reasons for remaining silent are increased by the
commonly-held belief that under Miranda a person has a right to remain
silent.' Although the decision was based on constitutional grounds, the
court in Duplessie seemed cognizant of these factors because its rule
apparently bars admissibility of any alleged admission based on the
defendant's silence in criminal cases. Duplessie requires the trial court
to determine whether the alleged admission was "manifested by con-
duct or statements which are unequivocal, positive, and definite."12 The
requirement of "conduct or statements" would thus appear to preclude
the use of silence, both protecting the defendant's constitutional rights
and satisfying the evidentiary requirement of relevancy. The Duplessie
rule also is not limited to post-arrest situations as was Miranda. There-
fore, silence should never be used against a defendant in a criminal case
in Minnesota.
In civil cases, the status of adoptive admissions based on silence in
Minnesota is unclear, because the Duplessie rule is limited to criminal
cases.13 The reason for this limitation presumably is that the constitu-
tional right to remain silent and right to confrontation apply only to
criminal cases. Even in civil cases, however, silence may not be an
indication of liability, and if it is not, then evidence of silence would be
of no probative value and thus would be inadmissible on evidentiary
grounds.84 In civil, as well as in criminal, cases a defendant may be
motivated to remain silent for many reasons other than admitting
wrongdoing. 5 He may be confused, afraid, indignant, timid, or under
the belief that to protect himself from liability he should not respond
to the accusation.8 6 Inquiry into human behavior is difficult.87 A person's
expression of scorn." The immortal Abraham Lincoln summed up his philoso-
phy on this subject in characteristic fashion: "If I should read much less answer,
all the attacks made upon me this shop might as well be closed for any other
business."
Id. at 585 n.1, 227 A.2d at 906 n.1. See also Matthew 27: 11-14 (Christ stood mute in the
face of Pilate's accusations).
80. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975). See Commonwealth ex rel. Staino
v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Super. 274, 280 n.1, 217 A.2d 824, 826 n.1 (1966) (Hoffman, J., dissent-
ing).
81. It is the common belief that there is a constitutional right to remain silent and few
persons realize that the rule of adoptive admissions may be an exception to this right. See
Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 335, 344 (1967).
82. 304 Minn. at 424, 231 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
85. However, the constitutional rights of Miranda are not applicable to civil cases. See
notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 75-81 supra and accompanying text.
87. See Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 335, 342 (1967).
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silence in most circumstances is so ambiguous, and can be justified by
such a multitude of explanations, that it is almost impossible to deter-
mine whether his silence was an expression of agreement or disagree-
ment with his accuser's statement.18 Thus, his silence lacks probative
value. The Duplessie rule, therefore, should not be limited to criminal
cases but should be applied to bar admissibility of admissions based on
silence or equivocal conduct regardless of the nature of the proceeding.
The Duplessie court treated admissions based on actions or state-
ments differently from those based on silence, allowing the former to be
admitted into evidence if they are "unequivocal, positive, and definite."
Because of the unlimited variety of statements or actions possible in
response to an accusation, the Duplessie prohibition against the use of
silence and equivocal statements is sound. If the Duplessie rule is fol-
lowed in both criminal and civil cases, the major problems with adoptive
admissions should be eliminated in Minnesota.
C. Prejudicial Impact
Even though evidence of an adoptive admission may satisfy the rele-
vancy requirement, it nonetheless should be excluded if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.89 The probative
value of the admission must therefore be balanced against the prejudi-
cial harm likely to result from its admission. 0 Adoptive admissions are
peculiarly susceptible to unfair prejudicial impact. Of primary concern
is the content of the accuser's statement, which may be both incriminat-
ing and inflammatory. If the defendant's response to the accusation is
not highly probative, then admission of the accuser's statement might
unfairly prejudice the defendant. Even if the jury is instructed to con-
sider the statement only as a basis for judging the reaction of the defen-
dant, the members of the jury may be unable to remove the statement
from their minds during deliberations and may improperly consider the
statement as proof of the matters asserted.' A clear limiting instruction
is essential when admitting relevant adoptive admissions, and if the
content of the accusation is especially inflammatory or if the probative
value of the defendant's reaction to the accusation is weak, then the
evidence should be excluded. 2
Although the constitutional requirements were the primary basis for
88. See, e.g., Hudson v. Augustine's Inc., 72 Il. App. 2d 225, 236-38, 218 N.E.2d 510,
516 (1966).
89. MINN. R. EVID. 403, effective July 1, 1977, provides in pertinent part that "although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or misleading the jury .... "
90. FED. R. EVID. 403, Note of Advis. Comm., reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. at 102-03 (1975).
91. See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 717, 172 P.2d 18, 28 (1946).
92. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, at 801-125 to -126.
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the opinion, in Duplessie the court also seemed to be cognizant of the
possible prejudicial impact of adoptive admissions, stressing that the
probative value of the defendant's conduct was minimal while the effect
of the accuser's statement was great. 3 The court thus balanced the
value of the alleged admission with the impact of the content of the
accuser's statement and decided that the evidence should not have been
heard by the factfinder. This balancing approach is proper and should
be utilized in all adoptive admission cases whether or not the constitu-
tional protections are available.
D. Hearsay
The hearsay rule, as it developed at common-law, excludes state-
ments made out of court which are offered as proof of the facts as-
serted. 4 Rule 801(a) of the new Minnesota Rules of Evidence includes
in the definition of "statement" the "nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended by him as an assertion." 5 Thus the prohibition against
the introduction of hearsay applies to nonverbal conduct that is in-
tended as an assertion. Nonverbal conduct that is not intended as an
assertion is not a statement and is therefore not affected by the hearsay
rule." The key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion unless it
is intended to be one.
97
Nonverbal conduct, such as the act of identifying a suspect in a lineup
by pointing is clearly the equivalent of words and assertive in nature,
and thus is governed by the hearsay rule. However, nonverbal conduct
may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of a
belief in the existence of the condition sought to be proved, from which
93. 304 Minn. at 424, 231 N.W.2d at 553.
94. Prior to the end of the sixteenth century, testimony attributable to hearsay was
received without question. As objections to such practice grew, hearsay was limited to
admissions only when offered in support of non-hearsay testimony. By the middle of the
eighteenth century courts were generally rejecting hearsay, citing a lack of oath and lack
of opportunity to confront witnesses as the reasons for the rejection. The hearsay rule had
been accepted at common-law for almost one hundred years before the Bill of Rights was
drafted. The Bill of Rights contained a clause requiring that in criminal cases the accused
be confronted with the witnesses against him. For a historical development of the hearsay
rule, see 5 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1364-65 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1974). Rule 802 of the new rules of evidence reinforces the principles of the hearsay rule:
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court or by the Legislature." MINN. R. EvID. 802.
95. MINN. R. EVID. 801(a)(2).
96. MINN. R. EvID. 801(a), comment.
97. See FED. R. EvID. 801(a), Note of Advis. Comm., reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. at 527-
28 (1975). The preliminary comment to the Minnesota Rules of Evidence indicates that
because the recommended rules were modeled after the federal rules, the Minnesota bar
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belief the existence of the condition may be inferred 5 For example, a
party's silence in response to accusatory statements of fault at the scene
of an auto accident may not be intended by him as an admission of fault,
but nevertheless his silence may be deemed to reflect an awareness of
fault.
Thus, the hearsay rule is not violated if the testimony is only as to
the defendant's nonassertive conduct and the party testifying was also
an observer. Equivocal adoptive admissions, as nonassertive conduct,
therefore could be used as a method of bypassing the hearsay rule and
achieving the admission of a damaging accusation without granting the
defendant the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the accuser.
The admission is not being admitted to prove the substance of the
accuser's statement, but rather as a predicate to the showing of the
defendant's reaction to the statement." In other words, it is the nonas-
sertive conduct or reaction of the accused in view of the statements that
may be admissible; the statements alone are not admissible as proof of
their substance. 00
However, it is difficult to justify the distinction which allows testi-
mony as to the nonassertive conduct. Where such conduct is offered as
proof of some fact, it is an implied assertion of the actor's beliefs regard-
ing such fact and hence is just as objectionable as an express assertion. 0'
In addition, the jury may be prejudiced by the evidence of the accu-
ser's statement.02 To determine the proper interpretation of the defen-
dant's silence or failure to deny an incriminating statement, the jury
must consider closely the content of the statement made by the accu-
ser.'03 In so doing it may be difficult for the jury to disregard the content
98. See FED. R. EvID. 801(a), Note of Advis. Comm., reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. at 527-
28 (1975).
99. State v. Rediker, 214 Minn. 470, 480, 8 N.W.2d 527, 532 (1943).
100. State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 513-14, 57 N.W.2d 419,423 (1953). Originally
adoptive admissions were recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Model Code
of Evidence, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute, proposed that
adoptive admissions be an exception to the hearsay rule and incorporated this position in
rule 507: "Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissible against a party to the action if
the judge finds that . . . (b) the party with knowledge of the content of the statement by
words or other conduct manifested his adoption or approval of the statement or his belief
in its truth." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507 (1942).
However, the new Minnesota rules of evidence follow the common-law tradition,
adopt the position that adoptive admissions are not hearsay, and exclude them from the
definition of hearsay. See MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(B).
101. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 214, 217 (1948).
102. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text.
103. While the defendant's response to the accusatory statement is excluded from the
definition of hearsay, it is necessary to admit the inculpatory statement to explain the
reaction. This is true even though by itself the statement would be excluded as hearsay.
See Comment, Adoptive Admissions, Arrest and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
[Vol. 3
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of the statement. Adoptive admissions by their nature require an aware-
ness by the factfinder of both the content of the statement and the
defendant's response, and the defendant may be prejudiced if the una-
vailable source of the accusation lends such a great deal of credibility
that the jury is swayed. For example, if the witness testified that a priest
accused the defendant of wrongdoing, the jury may be heavily influ-
enced by the occupation of the accuser and accept the content of the
statement.
The court in Duplessie faced the hearsay problem, but did so under
the quise of the confrontation clause.104 The court held that the charac-
terization of otherwise hearsay testimony as an adoptive admission is
improper if the primary effect of the testimony is to admit damaging
hearsay accusations and the defendant's reaction is of little probative
value. Once again, although basing the opinion on constitutional
grounds, the court was sensitive to the hearsay problems inherent with
adoptive admissions. This concern should be followed by the courts in
all adoptive admissions cases, whether or not the sixth amendment
confrontation clause is at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
In Duplessie, the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated the rule
that adoptive admissions are admissible only if they are unequivocal,
positive, and definite. The court's decision was based primarily on con-
stitutional grounds and its rule was limited to criminal cases. The
Duplessie rule expresses a valid concern for the use of adoptive admis-
sions and represents a solution to the problems they raise in criminal
cases. Although basing its decision on the nature of the defendant's
response, the court also weighed the probative value of the statement
and cautioned against using such testimony if the primary effect was to
admit damaging hearsay accusations. Thus, a two-part test can be de-
veloped which deals with the constitutional problems and the problems
of relevancy, prejudice, and hearsay and which is applicable to both
criminal and civil proceedings. The traditional common-law rules gov-
erning relevancy, prejudice, and hearsay, which were mentioned by the
court, would provide the first part of the test for adoptive admissions
in both criminal and civil proceedings. In criminal cases, the second part
of the test must also be satisfied-an unequivocal, positive, and definite
adoption is necessary to evidence a waiver of constitutional rights. Thus,
both the probative value and the nature of adoptive admissions must
be examined to determine their admissibility.
A Suggested Constitutional Imperative, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 556 (1964); Note, Tacit
Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 210, 212 (1963).
104. See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
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